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COMMENT
DEATH FOR SALE: A CALL TO REGULATE THE
VIATICAL SETTLEMENT INDUSTRY
INTRODUCTION
Viatical companies gamble on people's lives. They purchase the
life insurance policy of a terminally or chronically Ml patient, pay
the premiums, and wait. In the meantime, the patient may use the
cash proceeds from the transaction in any way. When the person
dies, the viatical company receives the benefits of the policy. The
sooner the patient dies the greater the viatical company's profit; the
gamble is that the person will die before a date predicted by the
viatical company.
The viatical settlement industry has been prospering for nearly
10 years.' By 1996, life insurance policies totaling approximately
$500 million were sold in viatical settlements.2 In the United
States alone, the projected figure for 2000 is $4 billion? Viatical
settlements are available in all 50 states. The industry was
launched in 1989 with an eye toward AIDS patients4 and today is
'" The viatical settlement industry began with three companies in 1989. See Viatical
Association of America (copy on file with the author) [hereinafter VAA Newsletter] (some
of this information and additional updates can be located at
<http'//www.cais.comviatical>).
2 Rod Schrader, Viaticals Link Terminal Patients to Investors, PUGET Bus. L, Sept.
26, 1997, at 18B. An actuarial and consulting firm in Chicago, Milliman & Robertson,
Inc., estimated the 1995 number to be more than $322 million and the 2004 estimate to
be double. See VAA Newsletter, supra note 1.
' Schrader, supra note 2, at 18B.
"The viatical settlement industry emerged during the late 1980s as a result of the
AIDS crisis and has grown rapidly, from $5 million in life insurance policies in 1989, to
perhaps $200 million in 1995." Securities and Exchange Commission v. Life Partners, Inc.
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looking to bargain with other terminally and chronically ill patients
and the elderly Beginning with three companies in 1989, the
viatical industry has expanded to between 40 and 50 companies.6
A secondary market has evolved in which anyone can invest by
contacting his or her local broker. Still, the industry remains virtu-
ally unregulated, as no national regulation exists and less than 20
states require licensing of viatical settlement companies.7
The viatical settlement industry historically has been immune
from such regulation. Although the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners (NAIC) has promulgated both the Viatical
Settlements Model Act (Model Act)8 and the Viatical Settlements
Model Regulation (Model Regulation)9 and some states have draft-
ed similar viatical regulations, "[me]any states have not yet codified
viatical regulations.... leaving much of the terminally ill popu-
lation without protection from potential abuses by viatical settle-
ment purchasers."'" Rather, the industry has flourished through
privileges, such as lack of restrictions and preferential income tax
treatment. The Model Act and the Model Regulation are a good
start, but are only guidelines and have only been adopted by a
minority of states. The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has
attempted to assume regulatory responsibilities for the secondary
market by treating the investments as securities," but the Court of
& Pardo, 898 F. Supp. 14, 17 n.1 (D.D.C. 1995) [hereinafter Pardo 1].
' See David W. Dunlap, Recalculating Death-Benefit Math, N.Y. TIMEs, July 30,
1996, at Cl (citing William E. Kelley, Executive Director of the Viatical Association of
America, who indicated future growth "would have to come from people with terminal ill-
nesses like cancer, advanced heart disease and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, or Lou
Gehrig's disease"). Other possibilities include patients with breast, bone, esophagus, lung
and prostate cancer and alzheimers disease. See id.; see also National Association of
Insurance Commissioners, 1995 Winter National Meeting, 1995-4 NAIC PROC. 763, 767
[hereinafter Winter 1995 Report] (Gary Choades of Viaticus commenting on the industry's
future clients).
6 See VAA Newsletter, supra note 1.
. See id.; see also Denise M. Schultz, Angels of Mercy or Greedy Capitalists? Buy-
ing Life Insurance Policies from the Terminally Ill, 24 PEPP. L. REv. 99, 110 (1997)
(finding that many states have not yet codified viatical regulations).
V cA=AL SErLEMENTs MODEL ACr (1993), reprinted in National Association of
Insurance Commissioners, June 1993 National Meeting, 1993-2 NAIC PROC. 714, 724-27
[hereinafter June 1993 Report].
9. VIATICAL StTLEMENTS MODEL REGULATION (1994), reprinted in National Associ-
ation of Insurance Commissioners, Summer, 1994-2 NAIC PROC. 549, 572-74 [hereinafter
Summer 1994 Report].
" Schultz, supra note 7, at 110.
See Pardo 1, 898 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1995); Securities and Exchange Commission
v. Life Partners, Inc. & Pardo, 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Pardo Il].
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Appeals for the District of Columbia has held that securities law
does not apply and therefore this market remains unregulated.' 2
This Comment will address the need for regulation in the
viatical settlement industry. Regulation is necessary to curb the
potential for abuse stemming from the unbalanced relationship
between the viatical company and the viator-the patient selling his
or her life insurance policy. On one side of the transaction is a
large company with numerous resources, lots of money, and enor-
mous bargaining power. On the other side is a terminally or chron-
ically ill patient or elderly person with little money, big expenses,
and few resources. Even if viatical settlements are a positive alter-
native for the terminally and chronically ill, regulation is necessary
to ensure that the transaction is fair, just as transactions in other
industries are regulated to prevent coercion and unconscionable
conduct, because the viatical industry engages in activities that go
beyond existing laws protecting buyers and sellers such as contract
law, securities law, and the Uniform Commercial Code. 3
This Comment will address the issue of regulation by consid-
ering how existing regulations were formulated and how the indus-
try has evolved since their creation. There is a significant potential
for abuse in the industry and its secondary markets, yet existing
regulations have not been widely adopted, and do not address
issues that have arisen with the growth and broadening of the
industry. This Comment therefore proposes that legislatures regulate
both the primary and secondary markets of the viatical industry.
I. BACKGROUND
On the surface, a viatical settlement is a simple transaction
between two people in which one person, the viator, sells his or
her property for cash to the buyer, the viatical company. 4 The
essential components of the bargain are a life insurance policy, a
significant sum of money, and the death of the insured. One per-
ception of the deal is that a big company is taking advantage of a
desperate consumer. On the other hand, the consumer is getting
much needed money to live the rest of his or her life in dignity
," See Pardo II, 87 F.3d 536; see also infra notes 167-70 (providing a more detailed
treatment of Pardo I).
" See Pardo I, 898 F. Supp. at 17 n.2 ("Viatical settlements stretch existing laws
that protect the interests of buyers and sellers.").
" See infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text for further discussion of the viatical
settlement process.
70319981
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and happiness without financial concerns. While there is probably a
little bit of both going on, deeper analysis reveals that these settle-
ments involve much more than the ordinary buyer-seller relation-
ship. The potential for abuse and the amount of risk involved is
high, and the buyer and seller are not the only parties affected by
the transaction. Based upon these considerations, regulation of the
viatical settlement industry is in everyone's best interest.
A. The Parties
The buyer is a large company which is part of an even larger
industry. The viatical settlement industry emerged as a result of the
AIDS crisis in the late 1980s"5 and has grown rapidly, expanding
its reach to other terminally and chronically ill patients. 6 The in-
dustry projects the elderly population to be the next generation of
viators. 1
7
Viatical companies provide a service to people desperately in
need of money. Viators may use the cash proceeds received from
their life insurance policy to pay medical bills and do things for
themselves and their families that they could not do before.
Viatical companies, however, do not have complete advantage over
viators. They also are taking a big risk in these transactions and
their profits are not certain. 8 It is difficult to predict life expec-
tancy, and with new treatments being developed every day, predic-
tions become even less certain. 9 If the viator lives much longer
than expected, the viatical company will take a loss.
The seller is usually a consumer who is faced with death and
is in a weakened physical, mental, and financial condition. Few
consumers know what a viatical settlement is or how it works."
Potential viators do not have the time or resources to thoroughly
research their options and a viatical settlement may bring about
unexpected consequences as a result. For example, Congress has
made viatical settlements more attractive by giving them prefer-
" See Pardo 1, 898 F. Supp. at 17; see also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
The notion of viatical settlements has been around for quite a long time. See Malcolm E.
Osborn, Rapidly Developing Law on Viatical Settlements, 31 WAKE FORESr L REV. 471,
471 (1996).
" See Dunlap, supra note 5, at Cl.
17. See id.
' See Schultz, supra note 7, at 104-05.
See Dunlap, supra note 5, at C4.
See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Spring 1994 National Meet-
ing, 1994-1 NAIC PRoc. 352, 361 [hereinafter Spring 1994 Report].
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ential tax treatment.2' However, in order to get preferential treat-
ment, the viatical company must satisfy several requirements.! It
is not likely that a viator will know these requirements exist, or
whether a viatical company has complied with them. In addition,
because of the large cash payment received, the viator may lose
benefits from state- and federal-based entitlement programs.'
Viators may not be prepared to lose these benefits and may not be
able to afford to lose them despite the cash proceeds from the sale.
The impacts of viatical settlements felt by third parties high-
light the need for regulation of the industry. The sale of the
viator's life insurance policy leaves the viatical company the sole
beneficiary,' cutting off the original beneficiaries.' 5 Full disclo-
sure of the consequences of entering a viatical settlement would
prevent this as an unintended consequence. It may also prevent the
original beneficiaries from taking action against the viator or the
viatical company. Regulation, particularly licensing requirements,
will promote high standards within the industry and prevent abuse
within the industry. For this reason, regulation may be a benefit
to viatical companies as well.2
Several organizations have formed to represent the views of the
various participants in viatical settlements. To assist viators, the
National Association of People with AIDS (NAPWA) helps patients
get their money when they need it and can use it. NAPWA also
wants to ensure that patients are getting fair deals in the process.'
The Viatical Association of America attempts to satisfy the needs
and interests of both viators and viatical companies.'
2". See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of
Congress' treatment of viatical settlements under the tax code.
" See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
2 See VAA Newsletter, supra note 1.
2' See AMERiCAN CouNCaL oF LIFE INSURANcE, WHAT You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT
ACCELERATED BENEmrrs 7-8 (1993).
2 See id. It is possible to sell only part of the ownership of a life insurance policy.
See VAA Newsletter, supra note 1. The availability of this option depends on the viatical
company.
' See VAA Newsletter, supra note 1.
2' See IU; see also Spring 1994 Report, supra note 20, at 361.
' See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 1992 Winter National Meet-
ing, 1993-1 NAIC PROC. 779, 787 [hereinafter Winter 1992 Report].
2" See VAA Newsletter, supra note 1. A self-regulating agency such as the VAA is
one possible means for regulation of the industry. The problem is in achieving participa-
tion from all viatical companies. Currently only a few companies associated with the
viatical industry are members of the VAA. See id.
19981
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Finally, people who are not involved in or affected by the
viatical industry also assert their views because of an underlying
moral debate regarding viatical settlements. ° Some question the
ethics of an industry in which companies profit from the death of
the people with whom they deal. The fact that a viatical company's
profit is increasingly larger the sooner the viator dies makes people
even more uncomfortable. For these reasons, many people would
like to see the industry heavily regulated or even completely abol-
ished.
B. Current Attempts to Regulate
As the viatical industry has continued to grow, states have
attempted to find ways. to regulate viatical settlements. States have
found it difficult to bring viatical settlements under existing laws
which protect buyers and sellers."' Thus, they have begun passing
viatical settlement legislation codified in the insurance sections of
their respective codes.32
The first national attempt to regulate the industry began with
the NAIC drafting the Model Act and the Model Regulation?3
When the Model Act and the Model Regulation were promulgated,
the NAIC had AIDS and other terminally ill patients in mind.'
Among the first people contacted by the NAIC for comments on
viatical settlements was Bill Freeman, the Executive Director of
NAPWA. 5 NAPWA advocated viatical settlements as a positive
means for AIDS patients to live the rest of their lives in dignity.
In a survey, NAPWA found that the overwhelming needs of AIDS
patients were financial assistance and access to medicine and health
care.' The money obtained through a viatical settlement allows
AIDS patients to meet these needs3 7
NAPWA endorsed some regulation of the industry but warned
against too much restriction."8 The association agrees that full dis-
See Schultz, supra note 7, at 104.
" See Pardo 1, 898 F. Supp. 14, 17 n.2 (D.D.C. 1995).
32 See id.
See Spring 1994 Report, supra note 20, at 360.
See id.
See Winter 1992 Report, supra note 28, at 786-87 (speaking specifically for people
terminally ill due to HIV and AIDS, but acknowledging that other terminally ill people
may have similar concerns and therefore his comments would also apply to them).
' See id.
3" See id.
See id.
[Vol. 48:701
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closure of the consequences of the transaction should be required
and that viatical companies should be subject to background checks
and registration requirements.3 9 The association, however, fears too
many restrictions may be a disincentive for viatical companies to
conduct business. Thus, NAPWA discourages burdensome registra-
tion processes and mandated minimum payouts. It feels having too
much regulation will hinder viators from having a broad range of
choices and receiving the largest possible sum as quickly as possi-
ble. 40
Viatical settlement companies were also contacted for com-
ments.4 ' In general, viatical settlement companies are unopposed
to some regulation but advocate limited restrictions.4 For exam-
ple, viatical companies generally do not oppose disclosure require-
ments but do oppose mandatory minimum payouts.43 The viatical
companies argue that competition and the free market provide the
most effective and efficient means for achieving fair transactions.'
If abuse does occur, remedy may be sought under already existing
laws for breach of contract.4' Further, Mr. Willson, of the Nation-
al Viatical Association, stated that "the viatical industry was in the
process of becoming a self-regulatory industry."
In response, Commissioner David Lyons (Iowa), of the Viatical
Settlement Working Group, stated he was not surprised to see
individuals zealously protecting the viatical industry, which to that
point had not been subject to regulation.47 In the same sense, the
industry should not be surprised to see regulators zealously protect-
ing the viator's interests.' Lyons also argued that it is important
39- See id. at 787.
See id. at 786-87.
, See id., at 782. The American Council of Life Insurance (ACLI) was also contact-
ed for comments regarding viatical settlements, but did not respond. It did not find this to
be a pressing issue, nor a good way to expend its resources. See National Association of
Insurance Commissioners, Fall 1994 National Meeting, 1994-3 NAIC PRoc. 515, 517. The
ACLU has stated that viatical settlement companies "are not affiliated with or sanctioned
by the life insurance industry." ACLI Pamphlet, supra note 24.
'7 See Winter 1992 Report, supra note 28, at 782; June 1993 Report, supra note 9,
at 723-24; Spring 1994 Report, supra note 20, at 360-61.
'7 See Spring 1994 Report, supra note 20, at 361.
" See Winter 1992 Report, supra note 28, at 782.
See June 1993 Report, supra note 8, at 723 (Bill Crust of the National Viatical
Association spealing about free enterprise and the right to privacy emphasizing that over-
regulation intrudes on property rights).
See Spring 1994 Report, supra note 20, at 361.
'" See id.
41 See id.
7071998]
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for the industry and regulators to agree on issues of disclosure, en-
forcement, and minimum payouts.49
Based on the research of the Viatical Settlement Working
Group and outside comments from members of the viatical industry
and NAPWA, the NAIC formulated the regulations it thought were
necessary to ensure fairness and prevent fraud and abuse. These
include: licensing, filing, reporting, and confidentiality require-
ments; approval by the chief insurance regulatory official; full
disclosure of the ramifications of viatical settlements; assurance
regarding the mental capacity of the viator, refund provisions; time
restraints on when cash proceeds must be received; and minimum
payouts.O Some states have adopted the Model Act and the Mod-
el Regulation as drafted or with modifications.5 Other states have
developed their own laws or licensing requirements.52 Still, the
viatical settlement industry is not regulated at all in more than half
of the states 3 Further, with the expansion of the industry to other
people such as the elderly and the development of new treatments
for terminal and chronic illnesses, the Model Act and the Model
Regulation fail to address some of the new concerns arising, such
as longer life expectancies.O Application of the Models' minimum
payout requirements to longer life expectancies is proving difficult
as the industry has begun looking to the elderly and to terminal
and chronic illnesses other than AIDS.
C. Focus of Regulation
Two areas must be considered for regulation: viatical settle-
ments and secondary marketing of viatical settlements.
' The biggest gap between these two bodies is the issue of minimum payouts. See
id.
5, See June 1993 Report, supra note 8, at 724-27; Summer 1994 Report, supra note
9, at 572-74.
. See Schultz, supra note 7, at 106-14.
States which require licensing of viatical companies or require filing of an applica-
tion to conduct business include: California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Louisiana, North Carolina, North Dakota, New York, Oregon,
Texas, Virginia, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. See VAA Newsletter, supra note 1.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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1. Viatical Settlements
A viatical settlement is a transaction in which a terminally or
chronically ill, or elderly person sells his or her life insurance
policy to a third party and receives a lump sum cash payment
equal to a percentage of the policy's face value5 This money
may be used by the seller for any purpose.' In some cases the
cash proceeds may also be excluded from gross incomeY' The
viatical company then becomes the beneficiary of the life insurance
policy. The NAIC specifically defines four relevant terms in the
Model Act"5 viatical settlement contract, viatical settlement pro-
vider, viatical settlement broker, and viator s9
A viatical settlement can involve several parties. The viator is
the owner and seller of "a life insurance policy insuring the life of
a person with a catastrophic or life-threatening illness or condition
or the certificate holder." ° In general, a viatical settlement pro-
vider is the party buying the life insurance policy from the viator.
The Court in Pardo II defined a viatical settlement as:
[A]n investment contract pursuant to which an investor acquires an interest in
the life insurance policy of a terminally ill person--typically an AIDS vic-
tim--at a discount of 20 to 40 percent, depending upon the insured's life ex-
pectancy. When the insured dies, the investor receives the benefit of the insur-
ance. The investor's profit is the difference between the discounted purchase
price paid to the insured and the death benefit collected from the insurer, less
transaction costs, premiums paid, and other administrative expenses.
Pardo II, 87 F.3d 536, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also VAA Newsletter, supra note 1
(stating that a viatical settlement is "the sale or absolute assignment of all or part of the
ownership of, or beneficial interest in an existing individual policy or interest in a group
policy").
See VAA Newsletter, supra note 1.
" See 26 U.S.C. § 101(g) (Dec. 31, 1996); see also infra notes 69-70 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the exclusion of viatical settlement proceeds from gross income).
' The terms were defined with the underlying purpose of creating a guideline for
regulating viatical settlements.
- Under the Model Act:
[A viatical settlement contract is] a written agreement entered into between a
viatical settlement provider and a person owning a life insurance policy [includ-
ing group policies] of a person who has a catastrophic or life threatening ill-
ness or condition. The agreement shall establish the terms under which the
viatical settlement provider will pay compensation or anything of value, which
compensation or value is less than the expected death benefit of the insurance
policy or certificate, in return for the policyowner's assignment, transfer, sale,
devise or bequest of the death benefit or ownership of the insurance policy or
certificate to the viatical settlement provider.
VIATICAL SEmem MoDEt Acr § 2(B) (1993).
Id. § (2)(C)-(D).
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The viatical settlement provider pays "compensation or anything of
value, which compensation or value is less than the expected death
benefit of the insurance policy," in exchange for the viator's "as-
signment, transfer, sale, devise or bequest of the death benefit or
ownership of the insurance policy." ' A viatical settlement broker
is someone who "offers or advertises the availability of viatical
settlements, introduces viators to viatical settlement providers, or
offers or attempts to negotiate viatical settlements" for a fee, com-
mission or other consideration.62
Congress has also defined the terms "viatical settlement provid-
er" and "terminally and chronically ill insureds" in the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). 3
Under this Act, a viatical settlement provider is defined as any
person regularly engaged in the trade or business of viatical settle-
ments.6 The Act also requires that the viatical settlement provider
be licensed or meet certain requirements under the Model Act and
the Model Regulation of the NAIC.6
At first, some industry participants argued that restrictions were
unnecessary because the industry was just starting up.' They also
argued that the viatical industry would be self-regulatory.67 Today,
almost 10 years since the industry's birth, the industry is well
established and secondary markets have evolved. Contrary to the
industry's predictions, there is very little self-regulation. 6
Congress has created an incentive for viatical settlements by
granting them preferential tax treatment. The HIPAA excludes cer-
tain viatical settlements from gross income as of January 1,
1996.69 Specifically, the Act treats viatical settlements as proceeds
of a life insurance contract payable by reason of death, thus ex-
cluding the cash payment received upon sale of the patient's insur-
ance policy from gross income. 0 In order to qualify for preferen-
61. Id.
' See d. § (2)(A).
63 Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 331(a) (adding 26 U.S.C. § 101(g) (Dec. 31, 1996)).
6' See 26 U.S.C. § 101(g)(2)(B)(i).
61 See id.
' See Spring 1994 Report, supra note 20, at 360. John Banks, Viaticus, argued that
he could see setting up limits, such as minimum payouts, in a mature industry but not in
a start-up industry. Id.
67- See id. at 361 (comment by Parker WVillson of the National Viatical Association).
6 Compare text accompanying note 44 (arguing that self-regulation is imminent), with
note 104 and accompanying text (noting the lack of incentives to self-regulate).
69- See 26 U.S.C. § 101(g).
See id. § 101(g)(2)(A).
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tial tax treatment, the IRS requires compliance with certain regula-
tory provisions of the Model Act and the Model Regulation.7' By
taking this action, Congress and the Internal Revenue Service not
only provided an incentive for viatical settlements, but also recog-
nize the legitimacy of the viatical settlement industry.? Since this
is an industry worthy of recognition, it is also worthy of regula-
tion.
The argument for regulation is supported by the text of HIPAA
in which the definitions of "viatical settlement provider," "termi-
nally ill insureds," and "chronically ill insureds" all include re-
quirements to meet certain regulatory criteria under the Model
Act.73 While this is not an explicit regulation of the viatical in-
dustry, it encourages viatical companies to follow some of the
regulatory guidelines of the Model Act. In order to qualify as a
viatical settlement provider, a person must be licensed as required
by state law or meet the requirements of terminally or chronically
ill insureds.74 In order to qualify as a terminally or chronically ill
insured, a person must meet the requirements of sections 8 and 9
of the Viatical Settlement Model Act.75
Section 8 requires a viatical settlement provider to disclose
certain information to the viator prior to or on the date the viatical
settlement contract is entered into.76 Section 9 is a list of general
rules which must be followed by the viatical settlement provider,
including: obtaining a written statement regarding the viators men-
tal capacity and a witnessed document in which the viator consents
to the viatical settlement contract; assuring confidentiality; provid-
. See id § 101(g).
7L See Schultz, supra note 7, at 119.
T See 26 U.S.C. § 101(g)(2).
7 26 U.S.C. § 101(g)(2)(B) provides:
The term "viatical settlement provider" means any person regularly engaged in
the trade or business of purchasing, or taking assignments of, life insurance
contracts on the lives of insureds described in paragraph (1) [an insured who is
chronically ill or terminally ill] if-
(I) such person is licensed for such purposes (with respect to insureds
described in the same subparagraph (1) as the insured) in the state in
which the insured resides, or
(I in the case of an insured who resides in a State not requiring the
licensing of such persons for such purposes with respect to such insured,
such person meets the requirements of clause (ii) [terminally ill insureds]
or (ii) [chronically ill insureds], whichever applies to such insured.
71 See VAncAL SE tTLEmEs MODEL Acr §§ 8, 9 (1993).
76 See id. § 8.
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ing an unconditional refund option; and providing specific duties as
to the payment of the cash proceeds." If these requirements are
not met, the viatical settlement will not qualify for preferential tax
treatment under the Act.7
Through the tax code, Congress and the IRS not only have
recognized the viatical settlement industry, they have also recog-
nized a need to ensure regulation of the industry and have looked
to both the Model Act and state law for such regulation.
2. Secondary Markets
Some viatical companies have turned to secondary markets to
protect themselves from some of the risk involved in viatical settle-
ment transactions. 9 One such market involves "fractionalizing," in
which a company facilitates "the sale of life insurance policies
from [the patient] to investors at a discount. ' These companies
sell fractional interests in the patient's insurance policy to retail
investors. The investors may purchase as little as 3% of the bene-
fits of an insurance policy and thus pay at a discount rate.81 Frac-
tionalizing spreads the risk among investors and allows each inves-
tor to have an interest in more than one life insurance policy.
Viatical companies can also purchase policies with long life
expectancies at discounts and then resell them later as short-term
viatical policies for higher prices.' This, too, makes transactions
involving longer life expectancies less risky and more appealing,
opening the door for transacting with the elderly and others with
longer life expectancies.
The SEC attempted to regulate the fractionalizing market, but
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Pardo II
denied the Commission jurisdiction over such investments.' The
SEC has not given up its argument." Although the SEC's petition
for rehearing was denied, the court's opinion arguably left the door
open for the SEC.' The court clarified that it was not creating a
7" See id. § 9.
See 26 U.S.C. § 101(g).
" See Barbara Mannino, Moving Beyond The Learning Curve (Emergence of Viatical
Insurance Settlements), BEsT's REV.-LIFE-HALTH INS. EDmIoN, Aug. 1997, at 72, 73.
' Pardo I, 898 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1995); see Mannino, supra note 79, at 74.
81. See Pardo If, 87 F.3d 536, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
See Mannino, supra note 79, at 73.
The SEC is only attempting to regulate the practice of fractionalizing, not the en-
tire viatical industry. See i&L at 74; infra note 155 and accompanying text.
'" See Pardo 1, 898 F. Supp. 14; Pardo HI, 87 F.3d at 549 (Wald, J., dissenting).
See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Life Partners, Inc. & Pardo, 102 F.3d
(Vol 48:701
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bright-line rule and that in other cases of fractionalizing, viatical
settlements may constitute securities.'
II. REGULATiNG THE VIATICAL SmETLEMENT INDUSTRY
A. Approaching Regulation
Since the beginning of the industry, there has been and contin-
ues to be a debate over the ethics of viatical settlements.' From a
public policy viewpoint, the debate is useful in identifying what
types of regulation will be effective and what amount of regulation
is necessary to protect all parties involved. However, because so
many viewpoints exist, it is difficult to pinpoint which is the best
approach to regulation. This difficulty is compounded by an in-
ability to place viatical settlements in any other regulated category
such as an insurance or goods transaction.
Although viatical settlements and the viatical settlement indus-
try have been defined by the legislature, courts, agencies, and
commentators, there has been little success in defining how to
regulate the industry. There has been greater success in determining
what viatical settlements are not to be regulated as. Viatical settle-
ments are not insurance contracts.88 Straight viatical settlements
are not securities. 9 Viatical settlements stretch existing laws regu-
lating the buyer-seller transaction.'
The next tep is to determine what viatical settlements are.
Viatical settlements are sales transactions between the owner of a
life insurance policy and the company purchasing the policy for a
cash payment.91 In most states, life insurance policies are treated
587 (D.C. Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Pardo III].
m See id. at 588; infra note 169 and accompanying text. Further, in Pardo I, the
court had ruled in favor of the SEC. See Pardo I, 898 F. Supp. at 14. There was a
strong dissenting opinion by Justice Wald in both Pardo 11 and Pardo I. See Pardo 11,
87 F3d at 549 (Wald, J., dissenting); Pardo III, 102 F3d at 589 (Wald, J., dissenting).
. See Schultz, supra note 7, at 103.
See Pardo 11, 87 F.3d at 18-19 ("Viatical settlements do not transfer or distribute
risk."). The risk to the buyer that is involved-that the seller will live longer than expect-
ed-is "inherent in any investment and does not serve the central purpose of insurance: to
transfer risk from the insured to the insurer." IL This transfer of risk has already been
done by the insurance company issuing the policy. See id.
" There is some debate over whether the secondary market of viatical settlements
does involve securities law. See Pardo I, 898 F. Supp. at 22; Pardo II, 87 F.3d at 549
(Wald, J., dissenting); infra notes 151-175 and accompanying text.
See Pardo 1, 898 F. Supp. at 17 n.2.
9' See VAA Newsletter, supra note 1.
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as the intangible personal property of the owner which may be
freely assigned or sold by the owner of the policy.'
Adding to the difficulty of determining how to regulate viatical
settlements, the industry has filtered into numerous areas. With
secondary marketing of viatical settlements, viatical investments
begin to look like securities.' If so, the SEC should become in-
volved in regulating the industry." With the enactment of the
HIPAA, Congress has taken a step in regulating the industry,'
and tax law may soon play an even bigger role if the elderly begin
selling their policies to avoid estate taxes." There is also an argu-
ment that the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) may be implicat-
ed.' Several approaches to regulating the viatical industry have
been proposed.
At one extreme are proponents of little or no regulation that
argue that regulation is unnecessary because there have been no
complaints of abuse within the industry. In Pardo II, the court
stated that the lack of regulation in the secondary market is due to
the fact that "neither policyholders nor investors have complained
of any abuse." Judge Wald, dissenting, countered with the argu-
ment that the fact that no complaints have yet been made does not
render abuse impossible or regulation unnecessary.' One reason
for a lack of complaints in the secondary market is that it is young
and rapidly expanding." Thus, the potential for abuse may be
intensifying.'"' Judge Wald further argued that "security laws are
intended to be prophylactic and prevent abuses before they arise."' 2
91 See id.
' See infra notes 159-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the securities as-
pects of viatical investments in the Pardo cases.
'9 See Pardo 11I, 102 F.3d 587, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Wald, J., dissenting).
9- See 26 U.S.C. § 101(g) (Dec. 31, 1996).
' See Daniel Golden, Life Insurance Policy-Buying Companies Shortchange the Dy-
ing, Heirs, BosToN GLOBE, Dec. 15, 1997, at All (stating that viatical companies are
"encouraging healthy elderly people to sell policies to avoid estate taxes").
. See Edward E. Blakeslee and Patricia A. Jackson, Viatical Settlements: A Primer,
33 Ass'N OF LIFE INS. COUNS. PROC. 187, 203 n.14 (1995).
g Pardo 11, 87 F.3d 536, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
19- See id. at 556 (Wald, J., dissenting).
' See id.
,o,. See id.
,0 Id. The industry is not free from abuse. For example, Florida has set up a hotline
which people can call to ask about abuses by viatical companies. See John Finotti, In-
vestigating Alternatives Diversity Can Mean More Than Just Putting Your Money in
Stocks, FLA. TIMES UNION, Dec. 28, 1997, at HI (warning that before investing, the
hotline should be checked for complaints against viatical companies); see also Mannino,
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There are also proponents of self-regulation."°3 However, there
is not much incentive for self-regulation. Only a minority of states
require licensing."' This does not give viatical companies of oth-
er states any incentive to be licensed; by not seeking a license
viatical companies can avoid filing and reporting requirements. !°5
The self-regulating approach could be successful if more incentives
were created.
As an example, the Viatical Association of America (VAA)
was created in 1994 as a non-profit national trade association of
viatical settlement companies." The VAA is a self-regulatory as-
sociation which encourages high ethical standards." The VAA is
dedicated to advocating the rights of both viators and member
viatical companies before Congress and state legislatures and agen-
cies. Member companies support regulation of the viatical settle-
ment industry and licensing of viatical companies."t The VAA
and its member companies believe that reasonable and fair regula-
tion by the states is in the best interest of both viatical companies
and viators.' 9 The VAA supports regulations regarding confiden-
tiality, viator privacy, disclosure requirements, and licensing."'
Some governmental incentive for this sort of self-regulation is also
provided by the HIPAA."'
These incentives may be meaningless if potential viators are
unaware of either them or viatical settlements. As discussed in this
Comment, few people are aware of all the options available to
them."2 Moreover, the consumer is in a desperate and vulnerable
supra note 79, at 74 (describing two cases of abuse: one in which the viatical company
defrauded investors, and one in which the viatical company defrauded viators). Further,
because there is a lack of regulation, abuse likely remains undiscovered.
103. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
104 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
,. See VIATcAL SErLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 3, 6 (1993) (stating that filing and
reporting obligations must be met to obtain a license).
101- See VAA Newsletter, supra note I.
o. See id.
. Al members of the VAA have pledged to obtain a license to do viatical business
in states where licensing or other authorization is required. See id. In states where no li-
censing is required, members have pledged not to do business there. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
" See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text (discussing the HIPAA's favorable
tax treatment of viatical settlement proceeds).
"I See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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state and may not have the resources or desire to survey viatical
companies. Thus, the first step in any regulatory approach, particu-
larly self-regulation, would be to educate the public on viatical
settlements. Viatical companies will have more incentive to be self-
regulating if the public better understands viatical settlements and
other available options.
States have found it difficult to regulate viatical settlements,
and to a greater degree the secondary market of viatical settle-
ments, under existing buyer-seller laws."' Therefore, states began
passing viatical settlement regulations to protect viators from being
exploited and to ensure confidentiality, privacy and full disclo-
sure."14 This legislation, codified in the insurance sections of state
codes, gives state insurance commissioners and administrators con-
trol over the viatical industry."' This regulation includes require-
ments regarding full disclosure and voluntary consent, confidentiali-
ty guarantees, protection from unfair competition, recording duties,
licensing, and minimum discount rates." 6
Such state legislation is a positive step toward regulating the
viatical settlement industry, but has been a very small step. Many
states have not implemented these regulations."' Only about
twenty states require licensing of viatical companies."' Those
states often disagree over what and how much regulation is neces-
sary"9 and this disparity may cause abuse between viatical com-
panies." As the industry expands, the original legislation geared
toward terminally ill patients with short life expectancies fails to
", See Pardo I, 898 F. Supp. 14, 17 n.2 (D.D.C. 1995).
Another way to deal with this problem is to stretch existing law to include viatical
settlements. The SEC has already attempted to do this with the secondary marketing of
viatical settlements. See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
"-- See Pardo 1, 898 F. Supp. at 17 n.2; Schultz supra note 7, at 106-14 (providing
some of the general and specific regulations adopted state-by-state).
"' See Schultz, supra note 7, at 107-14.
117. See id at 110 ("Many states have not yet codified viatical regulations. . . . leaving
much of the terminally ill population without protection from potential abuses by viatical
settlement purchasers.").
"8 See VAA Newsletter, supra note 1.
2,9. The greatest debate surrounds the issue of minimum discount rates. See Winter
1995 Report, supra note 5, at 767; National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
1996 Spring National Meeting, 1996-1 NAIC PRoc. 591, 618 [hereinafter Spring 1996 Re-
port].
'" See Goldberg v. Miller, 874 F. Supp. 874 (N.D. l. 1995) (action for tortious in-
terference with a contract between viatical companies).
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address new issues involving viators with longer life expectancies,
such as the elderly.'
The Model Act and the Model Regulation are a step toward
uniform regulation of the industry, but they -are only guidelines and
depend on self-regulation." Most states have not adopted these
regulations. In addition, it is difficult to apply the Models to the
expanding sectors of the industry. First, these groups did not par-
ticipate in the drafting process and therefore their needs and inter-
ests were not addressed. Second, the minimum payout figures in
place give these groups the least amount of money. Because these
people are likely to live longer, they will need longer term finan-
cial resources. A large lump sum of cash will not provide this, and
further, may result in the viator's ineligibility for state and federal
entitlement programs. Finally, because these viators have longer life
expectancies, they may need additional protection in some areas:
the viatical company will be checking on the person's health status
for a longer period of time, and it is more likely that the person's
policy will be sold to another viatical company or fractionalized
for other investors.
The Model Act and the Model Regulation do not address the
secondary market for viatical settlements. The only attempt at regu-
lating these markets has been by the SEC. The SEC has not yet
been successful in taking control over fractionalizing of viatical
settlements, although in some situations the SEC's approach may
work.12
Regulation of the viatical settlement industry will benefit both
viators and viatical companies." Regulation of the secondary
market for viatical settlements will protect investors."s There are
many requirements that can be made of viatical companies." The
question, then, is: What should be regulated, and to what extent?
2. See Winter 1995 Report, supra note 5, at 767; Spring 1996 Report, supra note
119, at 618.
,v See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text for discussion on self-regulation.
2. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
' See VAA Newsletter, supra note 1; see also Spring 1996 Report, supra note 119,
at 618.
' See Pardo I, 898 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1995).
" See VIATICAL SmrIhEMENTS MODEL Acr §§ 3, 5, 6, 8, 9 (1993); VIATICAL SET-
TLEMENTS MODEL REGULATION §§ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (1994); see also Schultz, supra note 7,
at 106-14 (citing state viatical regulations).
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B. Regulation of Viatical Settlements
As a starting point, viatical settlements are defined and restrict-
ed by some existing state law and the Model Act and Model Regu-
lation. The HIPAA also defines viatical settlements and requires
that certain regulations be followed before viatical settlements may
benefit from the preferential tax treatment."
One area of consensus is that full disclosure should be made to
potential viators prior to entering into the contract." Many pa-
tients do not know what a viatical settlement is and what its conse-
quences are.' There are many important consequences and alter-
natives that should be discussed with each person. t ' The VAA
has created a list of important ramifications that should be present-
ed to and considered by potential viators.'3'
First, the proceeds from viatical settlements may affect the
viator's eligibility for some state- or federal-based entitlement pro-
grams. For example, accepting a large cash payment for a life
insurance policy may result in the loss of disability income.13
Second, the viatical settlement may have tax implications. Spe-
cific criteria must be met under 26 U.S.C. § 101 before a viatical
settlement is excluded from gross income."34 Therefore, while
some sales of viatical settlements may receive preferential tax
treatment under section 101, others may still be taxable as income
to the viator. 3
5
Third, there are many alternatives to viatical settlements which
may serve the needs of the potential viator better than a viatical
settlement." These include taking out the maximum loans on the
'" See 26 U.S.C. § 101(g) (Dec. 31, 1996); supra notes 72-73 and accompanying
text.
'z See VAA Newsletter, supra note 1; Spring 1994 Report, supra note 20, at 361.
' See Spring 1994 Report, supra note 20, at 361.
'3 See VAA Newsletter, supra note 1; National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners, December 1993 National Meeting, 1993-4 NAIC PRoc. 642, 649 [hereinafter
December Report].
'3'. See VAA Newsletter, supra note 1 (stating that the VAA "strongly recommend[s]
that legal and financial advice be sought to determine how a viatical settlement may im-
pact [each persons] specific tax and entitlement status").
132 See id.; December Report, supra note 130, at 649.
" See December Report, supra note 130, at 649.
3' See 26 U.S.C. § 101 (Dec. 31, 1996).
'~x See VAA Newsletter, supra note 1; December Report, supra note 130, at 649.
" See VAA Newsletter, supra note 1.
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insurance policy, determining if the life insurance company offers
an accelerated death benefits program, obtaining the cash surrender
value of the life insurance policy, and borrowing from friends or
family'
37
Fourth, potential viators should consider the effect a viatical
settlement may have on other people, particularly beneficiaries of
the life insurance policy. By transferring the life insurance policy
to the viatical company, the viatical company becomes the benefi-
ciary of the policy.138 If the viator transfers all rights to the insur-
ance policy, the original beneficiaries are cut off from receiving
proceeds. 1
39
Additionally, regulation is necessary at this step to ensure pri-
vacy and confidentiality. Before entering into a viatical settlement,
the viatical company will obtain medical information regarding the
viator 1" Based on this information, the viatical company deter-
mines the viator's life expectancy. 4 ' Regulation may be particu-
larly important in the secondary markets because the viator's life
insurance policy will be passed on to more than just the viatical
company with whom the viator dealt. Thus, the viator's policy and
medical information will not be kept as confidential as the viator
may expect. At the least, the viatical company should disclose to
the viator that it will be fractionalizing or later selling the life
insurance policy. 42
Once a viatical settlement is made, additional privacy issues
will arise. The viatical company will do a periodic status check on
the viator 43 Regulation is needed to make this as least intrusive
as possible and, if possible, to eliminate it altogether. Time is very
'" See December Report, supra note 130, at 649; see also VAA Newsletter, supra
note 1. When borrowing money, the life insurance policy may be used as collateral to se-
cure the loan. See id. However, if this route is taken, it must be determined whether se-
curities laws will be implicated.
'" See ACLI pamphlet, supra note 24, at 7-8.
. See id.
'4 See Spring 1994 Report, supra note 20, at 360.
"' See id.
' In states that treat life insurance policies as any other personal property, once the
viator sells his or her policy, all rights to the policy have been sold. See VAA Newsletter,
supra note 1. Thus, the viatical company may transfer, sell, assign or do anything it
wants with the policy, just as the viator was able to. See id
"0, See Spring 1994 Report, supra note 20, at 360.
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precious for the terminal patient and it is not well spent with visits
from the viatical company.
Another highly disputed area of regulation is minimum
payouts.'" One reason for this is that viatical companies believe
the best way to ensure fairness is to allow as much capital as
possible to flow into the industry.'" Another basis for the dispute
is the extreme difficulty in estimating life expectancy. The Model
Regulation includes minimum payouts in recognition that some
limit was necessary.'" The numbers chosen are based on an actu-
arial analysis conducted by the Life and Health Actuarial Task
Force. 47 Enforcing minimum payouts ensures that viators will re-
ceive something for their life insurance policies. However, there are
several problems with using these, or any, numbers. It is difficult
to predict life expectancy, and reliable statistics regarding such
numbers would take several years to obtain.'" Further, it is even
more difficult to apply these numbers to viatical settlements involv-
ing the elderly or chronically ill patients with longer life expectan-
cies.
"'* See Schultz, supra note 7 at 112-14.
See Spring 1994 Report, supra note 20, at 360.
,, See Spring 1996 Report, supra note 119, at 618.
See Spring 1994 Report, supra note 20, at 362. The Model Regulation provides
that
[I]n order to assure that viators receive a reasonable return for viaticating an
insurance policy, the following shall be minimum discounts:
Insured's Life Expectancy Minimum Percentage
of Face Value Less
Outstanding Loans
Received by Viator
Less than 6 months [90%]
At least 6 but less than 12 months [85%]
At least 12 but less than 18 months [75%]
Eighteen months or more [70%]
VIATICAL SETrEMEmm MODEL REGULATION § 4 (1994).
. See Spring 1996 Report, supra note 119, at 618 (comments of Carol Ostapchuk
(Fla.), reporting on the actuarial analysis of minimum payouts during a meeting of the
Viatical Settlements Working Group of the Life Insurance Committee).
"o Those with longer life expectancies receive less money, but it is likely they will
need the most money. Further, these long-term viatical settlements are really an entirely
different product and thus, should not be treated the same as the short term viatical settle-
ments originally targeted by the industry. See id. (comments of Eleanor Perry (Vt)).
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Regulation of this issue is important for viators and viatical
companies because both parties assume risks with respect to the
viator's life expectancy. The risk increases as life expectancy be-
comes less predictable-for example, with the elderly. One argu-
ment against requiring minimum payouts is that viators will not
have the opportunity to get the best deal possible because compa-
nies will make offers close to the minimum numbers. 150 However,
because viators are in desperate need of money, they have an infe-
rior bargaining position. Minimum payouts can therefore prevent
companies from taking advantage of viators.
C. Regulation of Secondary Markets
Regulation of secondary markets is a different arena. State laws
dealing with viatical settlements and the Model Act and the Model
Regulation are only aimed at protecting viators.' Therefore, leg-
islatures must amend existing laws and models or create another
set of regulations to regulate secondary markets.' Regulation of
secondary markets is important for the same reasons viatical settle-
ments need regulation. There is a potential for abuse, particularly
because none of the existing viatical regulations address the sec-
ondary market. Furthermore, as the primary viatical industry grows
due to a broadened client base and Congress' preferential tax treat-
ment of viatical settlements, the secondary market will grow with it
and thus increase the potential for abuse."
There are additional concerns specific to the secondary market.
For example, confidentiality issues are magnified as aviator's life
insurance policy, and thus his or her medical records, are made
available to any number of potential investors." Where a viatical
company resells a long-term policy as short-term policy, the viator
'" See Winter 1992 Report, supra note 28, at 787.
". See Pardo 1H, 87 F.3d 536, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Wald, L, dissenting).
'm At the 1996 Spring meeting of the National Association of Insurance Commission-
ers, Commissioner Glenn Pomeroy (NM.D.) stated there were insurable interest concerns re-
garding the secondary marketing of viatical settlements, and therefore, a specific prohibi-
tion against secondary marketing should be considered. See Spring 1996 Report, supra
note 119, at 618.
s See Pardo II, 87 F.3d at 556 (Wald, J., dissenting) (arguing that this increase is
likely to lead to abuse, and therefore, securities laws should be implicated to prevent such
potential abuse).
"' Before investing, investors will want to know the life expectancy of the viator as
well as the value of his or her life insurance policy.
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will deal with completely new companies or investors. These new
investors, with whom the viator has never dealt with nor even seen
before, will now call the viator to keep track of his or her health
status. Viatical companies that do engage in secondary marketing
should disclose this to viators prior to the settlement.
The potentially simple regulation of the secondary marketing of
viatical settlements under securities laws was raised by the SEC in
its attempt to regulate fractionalization in the Pardo cases."'5 In
fact, "the securities laws are the only currently existing regulatory
scheme by which investors in viatical settlements can be protect-
ed.' ' s" One problem with applying securities laws is that it ap-
pears that not all fractionalizing would be treated the same
way."s Because of the ambiguity that exists, using this system to
regulate viatical settlements is likely to cause enforcement problems
and lead to abuses. Therefore, a stronger approach to regulating the
secondary markets is necessary. This may be accomplished by
defining and addressing viatical settlements in the securities laws.
Alternatively, the Model Act, Model Regulation, and state viatical
regulations may be an appropriate place to undertake regulation of
the secondary markets.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has
ruled upon the applicability of securities law to secondary viatical
transactions in the Pardo cases. In Pardo I, the District Court held
that fractionalizing was subject to securities law." This finding
was reversed in Pardo II, in which the Court of Appeals held the
viatical company's activity did not fall under the SEC's jurisdic-
tion.'59 In Pardo III, the court stated that under a different set of
facts, fractionalizing may be subject to securities law."6 While
the court did not formulate specific criteria, it stated that at least
"one entrepreneurial post-purchase service" is necessary.'
153 See Pardo I, 898 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1995); Pardo II, 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
Pardo II, 87 F.3d at 556 (Wald, J., dissenting).
" See Pardo 111, 102 F.3d 588 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that whether tractionalizing
is subject to the securities laws depends on the facts of the case).
"s See Pardo I, 898 F. Supp. at 22.
'. See Pardo II, 87 F.3d at 549.
'1 See Pardo I11, 102 F.3d at 588.
161. Id. at 590.
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In Pardo I, the SEC brought suit against Life Partners, Inc.
(LPI) alleging violations of securities laws. 62 LPI facilitates the
sale of viatical settlement to investors at a discounted price; specif-
ically, LPI finds, evaluates, and typically is assigned the life insur-
ance policy."6 Benefits are paid to LPI, who then pays the inves-
tors.' In determining whether LPI's action should be subject to
securities laws, the court applied the Howey test."e Under the
Howey test, an investment contract is subject to the securities laws
when it is a "transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his
money [1] in a common enterprise and [2] is led to expect profits
[3] solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.""les
The court in Pardo I held that all three prongs were met and
thus LPI's transactions were subject to securities laws. 6 The
court granted a preliminary injunction to the SEC on the basis that
LPI was selling unregistered securities in violation of the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.s The
court further ordered LPI to comply with the applicable securities
laws." However, the Court of Appeals in Pardo II reversed,
holding that while the first two prongs of the test were met, LPI's
activities did not fall under the third prong and were not subject to
securities laws. 70 The court found that the SEC failed to show
the investor's profits depended predominantly upon the efforts of
LPI. The court hung its hat on the fact that LPI performed primari-
ly pre-purchase services and its post-purchase services were simply
ministerial.
'6" See Pardo I, 898 F. Supp. at 17.
' See id
z See id.
' See id. at 19-22; Pardo II, 87 F.3d at 542-48 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Pardo HI, 102
F3d at 588. The SEC admits that straight viatical settlements are not securities. See
Pardo I, 898 F. Supp. at 19.
16 See Pardo I, 898 F. Supp. at 19 (citing SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293,
298-99 (1946)); Pardo 11, 87 F.3d at 540 (same).
" See Pardo 1, 898 F. Supp. at 22 ("LPI's basic policy is an investment contract
that is subject to federal securities law.").
See id. at 24; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), 77e(c) (1933) (section 5 of the Secu-
rities Act of 1933, prohibiting interstate commerce of unregistered securities); 77q(a)
(1933) (section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, prohibiting fraudulent interstate trans-
actions); 78o(a) (1934) (section 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, setting
forth registration requirements).
'6 See Pardo I, 898 F. Supp. at 24.
"A See Pardo II, 87 F.3d at 536.
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In dissent, Judge Wald criticized the majority's emphasis on
the fact that LPI's activities are merely pre-purchase activities.
Judge Wald advocated an approach which would allow pre-pur-
chase managerial activities to satisfy the Howey test when they are
the predominant cause for realization of profits. Judge Wald
found that LPI's pre-purchase activities met the third prong of the
Howey test because the investor's profits depend on LPI's accuracy
in estimating the viator's life span." Judge Wald noted that
LPI's promotional materials emphasize its thorough assessment of
the viator's life expectancy. Further, investors rely on LPI's assess-
ment because they can only review LPI's assessment and have no
access to medical records beyond what LPI has obtained. LPI's
estimate is critical because the longer the viator remains alive
beyond what was predicted, the lower the investor's profits willbe. 173
In Pardo III, the Court of Appeals rejected a bright-line rule
that fractionalizing could never be regulated under securities laws,
stating that "we only held 'that [1] pre-purchase services cannot by
themselves suffice to make the profits of an investment arise pre-
dominantly from the efforts of others, and that [2] ministerial func-
tions should receive a good deal less weight than entrepreneurial
activities."' 74 The court thqs made it possible for the SEC to
regulate secondary markets where there is at least one entrepreneur-
ial post-purchase service. 5 On the other hand, the court also
made it possible for viatical companies to avoid securities regula-
"71. See id. at 554 ("I have found no case which holds, as the majority here does, that
pre-purchase activities alone cannot satisfy Howey's third prong.") (Wald, J. dissenting).
"r See id. at 555 (Wald, J., dissenting).
r See id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
" Pardo III, 102 F.3d 587, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Pardo If, 87 F.3d at 548).
'75 See id. at 588 ("Absent even one entrepreneurial post-purchase service--and the
SEC could identify none--there simply is no on-going common enterprise involved in
owning an interest in an insurance contract from which the profit depends entirely upon
the mortality of the insured."). Because the holding in Pardo H rested on the fact that
LPI's profits "did not derive predominantly from the efforts of a party or parties other
than the investors," the court has left the door open for the SEC to bring fractionalizing
under securities laws. See Pardo 1, 87 F.3d at 537, 545-48 (applying the Howey test).
Where the facts allow the SEC to prove this third factor, under Pardo II and Pardo II,
the SEC's jurisdiction over those investments in viatical settlements will be upheld. How-
ever, there is some disagreement over whether the Court of Appeals really leaves the door
open for the SEC to claim jurisdiction. See Pardo 111, 102 F.3d at 589 (Wald, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that the majority creates a bright-line rule).
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tions by engaging in what the Pardo court found to be only pre-
purchase activities. Thus, even with the SEC's effort, secondary
markets will continue to be unregulated.
9L CONCLUSION
The viatical settlement industry has expanded rapidly in its first
decade, moving from a client base of AIDS patients to one of
numerous terminally and chronically ill patients and the elderly.
Several attempts at regulation through the states, Congress, and the
NAIC have been made, but have not been successful. The first step
in regulation, defining viatical settlements and the viatical industry,
has already been taken. The next step is to educate the public.
People can better protect themselves if they are aware of all of the
options and protections available to them. Finally, regulations must
be implemented. Several approaches to regulation have been dis-
cussed, including self-regulation, bringing viatical settlements under
existing laws, and national viatical regulations. Regulation of the
viatical industry is necessary to protect viators from exploitation at
a time in their life when they are most susceptible to abuse. Regu-
lation will also protect viatical companies from abuse within the
industry. Further, as a public policy matter, regulation will encour-
age high ethical standards within the industry.
JOY D. KosmwIcz
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